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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 990195-CA
vs.
JEREMIAH MAUL,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1998).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to arrest judgment by denying Maul's
motion for a new trial based on juror bias? A trial court's denial of a motion for new
trial is reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard. State v. Williams. 712 P.2d
220, 222 (Utah 1985). This issue was preserved in a post-trial motion and at a hearing
(R. 168-79, 244).
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CONTROT JJNG STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The text of Rules 23 and 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is set forth
in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Jeremiah Maul appeals from the judgment and sentence by the Honorable K.L.
Mclff in Sixth District Court after a jury trial at which Maul was convicted of
aggravated burglary and kidnapping, first degree felonies, and theft of a firearm, a
second degree felony.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

Maul was charged by information filed in the Sixth District Court on or about
January 9, 1998, with the following two charges: Aggravated Burglary and Aggravated
Kidnapping, first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §§ 76-6-203,
76-5-302; and Theft of a Firearm, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated § 76-6-412 (R. 1-2).
On January 21, 1998, a preliminary hearing was conducted before the Honorable
David Mower, after which Maul was bound-over on all three charges for arraignment
(R. 241).
On February 18, 1998, Maul filed with the trial court a Notice of Alibi (R. 40).
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On April 10, 1998, Maul filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence (R. 44-61). After
a hearing, Judge K.L. Mclff denied Maul's motion on June 29, 1998 (R. 116-24. 242).
On August 27-28, 1998, a jury trial was conducted before Judge Mclff, at the
close of which Maul was found guilty of all counts in the aforementioned information
(R. 245, 246, 159-61).
On September 14, 1998, Maul filed with the trial court a Motion for a New Trial
along with supporting affidavits which claimed that Juror Christine Christensen failed
to disclose a relationship to several of the trial witnesses (R. 168-79). On November 4,
1998, a hearing was held on Maul's motion (R. 244). A copy of affidavits from Juror
Christine Christensen and from defense witnesses Marie and Angela Goode, which
were filed with the trial court in relation to the motion are attached in the Addenda.
At the hearing on Maul's motion, Juror Christine Christensen testified that she
has been a resident of Fountain Green for eight years (R. 244 at 7). Christensen
testified that one of her neighbors is Craig Nielson (R. 244 at 8). Christensen testified
that at court she became aware that Craig Nielson is Clay Nielson's father (R. 244 at
8). Both Craig and Clay testified against Maul during trial.
Christensen also testified that in 1993 she was employed at the Super 8 Motel
with Mary Goode, a defense witness and the mother of another defense witness, Angie
Goode (R. 244 at 9). Christensen testified that she worked at the motel for two months
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and that while she worked their she was acquainted with Mary Goode-but that it was
not a close relationship (R. 244 at 10-11).
Christensen testified further that she also has known Angela Goode for many
years (R. 244 at 13). Christensen testified that she remembered being present at one
social activity with Angela Goode but that she was not aware of any rumors concerning
a relationship between Angela and her husband (R. 244 at 13).
Christensen's affidavit indicates that she was only "acquainted" with Angela and
Mary/ie Goode along with Deputy Gary Larsen, a trial witness, and Cal Nielson, the
brother of witness Clay Nielson (R. 180-82).
Angela Goode, who has been a resident of Fountain Green along with her
mother, testified that she knew Christine Christensen and her husband (R. 244 at 20).
Angela testified that she has been to the Christensen's house on three-four occasions
and has hung out with the same crowd as Christensen's husband (R. 244 at 20-22).
Angela classified her relationship with Christensen as a casual relationship (R. 244 at
23). Angela also testified that she, at some point, had heard of accusations being made
concerning her relationship with Christensen's husband (R. 244 at 24). Angela testified
that she was informed of these accusations by the wife of Christen's best friend (R. 244
at 25-27).
Mary Goode submitted an affidavit to the trial court in which she testified as
follows: For the past six years she has been employed at the Super 8 Motel in Nephi,
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Utah (R. 169). In 1996 or 1997, Christene Chris tensen was employed at the motel as a
maid; and that "her work under my supervision was unsatisfactory" which resulted in
Christensen's termination (R. 169). Mary believe that this termination resulted in
feelings of animosity towards her by Christensen and that this animosity would have
tainted her impartiality as a juror (R. 170).
Maul's motion was subsequently denied by Judge Mclff with written findings
entered on December 16, 1998 (R. 196-202). The trial court found: One, that during
jury selection, "Christine Christensen did not advise the court about any acquaintance
she had" with Clay Nielson or Mary and Angela Goode (R. 197). Two, that the court
had instructed all potential jurors to disclose any relationship with witnesses that was
more than a casual acquaintanceship (Id.). Three, that "Christine Christensen's
relationship and knowledge relating to Mary Goode, Angela Goode, Clay Nielson and
Craig Nielson are all of a casual nature" (R. 199). Four, that "Mary Goode and
Angela Goode both knew who Christine Christensen was, and that she was a potential
juror prior to her being picked to serve on the jury" (R. 199). Accordingly, the trial
court concluded that no actual or implied bias by Christensen against Maul had been
shown; and that no basis would have existed for any challenge for cause against
Christensen (R. 199-200).
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On January 6, 1999, Maul was sentenced to concurrent terms in the Utah State
Prison (R. 203-08, 243). On March 4, 1999, after a thirty-day extension, Maul filed a
Notice of Appeal with the Sixth District Court, and this action followed (R. 233-39).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Ginger Mellor testified that in January of 1998 she was house-sitting for her
sister and brother-in-law, Brenda and Craig Nielson, in Centerfield, Utah, for
approximately five-seven days (R. 245 at 94-95). The house was also occupied by
Craig Nielson's twenty-three year old son, Clay Nielson, and by Brenda Nielsen's
fourteen-year old son, Kent Ashworth (R. 245 at 95). While Mellor was house-sitting,
the three Nielson's were gone and she was at the home with Ashworth and her thirteenyear old daughter, Christine (R. 245 at 96).
Mellor testified that on the night of January 6, 1998, she went to bed upstairs in
the master bedroom, while the kids slept on the ground floor in Ashworth's room (R.
245 at 97). After 1:00 a.m., Mellor was awakened by the Nielson's dog barking (R.
245 at 99). Mellor said she sat up in bed to find a flashlight in her face (Id.). The
male individual behind the flashlight told Mellor to sit still and then asked her who
lived in the house and asked where "Clay" was (R. 245 at 101). Mellor testified that
she advised the individual that Clay was out-of-town with the Nielson's (R. 245 at
102). Mellor did not recognize the individual's voice (R. 245 at 103). Mellor testified

6

that it was 2:01 a.m. when this conversation occurred (R. 245 at 103-04). Mellor then,
upon request, told the individual her name and that there were two kids downstairs (R.
245 at 104). Mellor subsequendy heard another male voice (R. 245 at 106).
Mellor testified that the individual with theflashlightinformed her that "they had
been tipped off that there was a lot of money that was in the house" and asked her
where it was located (R. 245 at 107). Mellor informed him that she was house-sitting
and had no knowledge of any money except that in her wallet (Id.). Mellor said she
was then told not to mess with the individual and threatened with her safety (R. 245 at
108).
The individual then took Mellor downstairs where they checked to make sure the
kids were asleep before going to Clay's room (R. 245 at 109-112). Mellor was told to
lay down on Clay's bed on her stomach and she was tied up with an extension cord (R.
245 at 112-15). Mellor testified that the individuals then ransacked Clay's room before
the male individual who had been talking to her came back and showed her a loaded
gun (R. 245 at 117-18). Mellor testified that she then heard noise upstairs for
approximatelyfifteen-twentyminutes (R. 245 at 119). Finally, the individual who had
spoken repeatedly with Mellor came back downstairs. He apologized but told her not
to call the police or they would be back (R. 245 at 120).
Mellor testified that the individuals left at approximatley 2:45 a.m. and that she
called out to the kids who came and untied her (R. 245 at 120-21, 130). Mellor then
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called Brenda Nielson on her cellular phone and told her what had happened (R. 245 at
122). Nielson told her to get the handgun out of the gun cabinet for protection and to
take the kids to Sterling to Mellor's parents house (R. 245 at 123). However, Mellor
testified that the gun was missing (R. 245 at 125). Then she and the kids went to
Sterling (R. 245 at 126).
Once they arrived in Sterling, Mellor testified that her mother called the police
(Id.). At approximately 8:00 a.m. Mellor and her father went to the Sanpete County
Sheriffs Office (R. 245 at 127). Officer Blake Edwards informed Mellor that they had
a suspect in custody and that he wanted to do a voice identification over a speaker
phone (R. 245 at 128). Mellor testified that after hearing the suspect speak, she
informed Edwards that he was the individual who had been in the house earlier that
morning (R. 245 at 131).
Blake Edwards, a deputy with the Sanpete County Sheriffs office, testified that
at approximately 3:45 a.m. on January 7, 1998, he was notified through dispatch of an
incident that had happened in Centerfield at 150 West Hansen Lane (R. 245 at 168-70).
Edwards then called the complainant, Ginger Mellor, in Sterling (R. 245 at 170-71).
Mellor informed Edwards of a burglary at her sister's house (R. 245 at 171). After
checking the Nielson home, Edwards went to Sterling and spoke with Mellor at her
parents house (R. 245 at 172).
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Edwards then called the Nielsons' on their cellular phone and spoke with Clay
Nielson (R. 245 at 173). Edwards explained the situation to Clay and testified that
Clay informed him that "It's that Goddamned Jeremy" (R. 245 at 174). Edwards was
informed by Clay that he was involved in a custody battle with a girl named Angie and
that she was living in American Fork with a person named "Jeremy" (R. 245 at 175).
Edwards was told to call Angie's mother Mary in Fountain Green for more information
(R. 245 at 176).
Edwards contacted Mary Goode by telephone who confirmed that she was
Angie's mother (R. 245 at 177). Edwards testified that he was informed that Angie and
Jeremy were at her mother's house at "midnight" and she gave him Angie and Jeremy
Maul's address in American Fork (R. 245 at 177-78). Edwards then contacted the
American Fork Police Department for assistance (R. 245 at 179).
According to Edwards, the American Fork police drove to the address and took
Maul into custody at approximately 7:15 a.m. (R. 245 at 181-82; R. 246 at 62).
Edwards then arranged for a telephonic voice identification with Maul in American
Fork and Mellor in Sanpete County (R. 245 at 182). Edwards read Maul his rights and
then asked him some questions addressing him by name (R. 245 at 185). Edwards
testified that Mellor identified Maul's voice as the voice who had been in the Nielson's
house within thirty seconds of Maul's waiver of his miranda rights (R. 245 at 187).
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Edwards drove to American Fork and interviewed Maul at the police department
at approximately 6:00 p.m. (R. 245 at 189). Edwards again mirandized Maul (Id.).
After a long conversation about the Centerfied incident, Edwards testified that Maul
confessed and indicated that he had been after Clay and intended to kill him (R. 245 at
191, 193). Edwards testified that Maul also admitted to taking a gun and money from
the house (R. 245 at 194-95). Edwards testifed that Maul told him that they had
stopped in Fairview for food and gasoline on the way home from the Nielson residence
(R. 245 at 216). However, Edwards testified that there was no food or gas
establishment open in Fairview between the hours of 2:30 a.m. and 5:00 a.m. (R. 245
at 217).
Edwards also testified that it took him an hour and forty-seven minutes to drive
from the Nielson's house in Centerfield to Maul's house in American Fork; and that the
distance was approximately 108.3 miles (R. 245 at 199, 201).
Gary Larsen, a Deputy Sheriff for Sanpete County, testified that he was at the
American Fork Police Department at approximately 6:00 p.m. on January 7, 1998,
assisting Edwards with an interrogation of Maul (R. 246 at 7). Larsen testified that
Edwards advised Maul of his Miranda rights before the questioning began (R. 246 at 810).
Larsen testified that during the interview he told Maul that he knew Angie
Goode and the father of her other child, Jeremy Ivory (R. 246 at 10). Larsen also
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testified that during the questioning, Maul confessed to entering into the Nielson
residence in Centerfield earlier that morning with the "intent to kill Clay before Clay
killed him" (R. 246 at 11). Larsen testified that Maul told him that "Clay had paid
someone to kill him" (Id.). Larsen also testified that Maul confessed to taking money
and a revolver from the Nielson residence and that he had tied Mellor on the bed with
an electrical cord (R. 246 at 13, 14-15). Larsen also indicated that Maul informed him
that he had stopped in Fairview on the way home from Centerfield (R. 246 at 17).
Clay Nielson testified that in January of 1998 he was living in Centerfied with
his father, Craig, and his step-mother, Brenda, and her son; and that on January 6-7,
1998, he was in New Mexico with Craig and Brenda (R. 246 at 27-28). Clay testified
that he and Angie Goode have a son together at that there were conflicts over custody
and visitation (R. 246 at 28-). Clay testified that he and Jeremy Maul had argued over
visitation and that threats had been made (R. 246 at 33-34).
Brenda Nielson testified that on the morning of January 7, 1998, she received a
phone call at approximately 2:30 a.m. from her sister Ginger Mellor, who was
housesitting for the Nielson's in Centerfied (R. 246 at 49, 51-52). Brenda testified that
Mellor told her that two men and entered the home looking for Clay and that threats
had been made (R. 246 at 49). Brenda testified that she told Mellor to leave the house
(R. 246 at 50). Brenda also testified that all clocks in the Nielson home are set fifteen
minutes fast (R. 246 at 52-53).
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Brenda testified that when she advised Clay of what had happened, he thought
that it might have been Maul who had entered the house (R. 246 at 58). Brenda
testified that before 8:00 a.m. she spoke with Mellor again and told her that it could
have been Maul who entered the house (R. 246 at 59).
Mary Goode, Angie Goode's mother, testified that she lives in Fountain Green,
Utah (R. 246 at 67). Mary testified that on January 6, 1998, Angie came to her house
at approximately 11:30 p.m. to pick-up some videos and money and left at
approximately midnight (R. 246 at 70). At 3:30 a.m. on January 7, 1998, Mary
received a call from Deputy Edwards about money and guns involving Angie (R. 246 at
68-69). Mary then called her mother, at approximately 4:00 a.m., and had her place a
call to Angie to make sure she was O.K. (R. 246 at 72).
Angela Goode testified that in January of 1998 she was living in American Fork
with Jeremy Maul, his mother and brothers, and her two sons (R. 246 at 88-89).
Angie testified that on the evening of January 6, 1998, she did drive to her mother's
house in Fountain Green leaving Maul at home in American Fork watching her two
children (R. 246 at 95). Angie testified that she returned home at approximately 1:15
a.m. (R. 246 at 97). She locked the house door, returned the car keys to Maul's
mother (on her dresser) and went downstairs where she and Maul slept (R. 246 at 97,
158). Angie testified that she found Maul asleep on their bed at this point (R. 246 at
97).
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Angie testified that she was awaken by Maul's mother to take a phone call from
her frantic grandmother and assured her that everyone was fine (R. 246 at 98-99).
Angie testified that she believed the phone call from her grandmother was made about
4:00 a.m. (R. 246 at 100). Angie and Maul went back to sleep, and Angie testified
that she was next awakened by Maul indicating that there were cops outside who
wanted to speak with them (R. 246 at 100).
Janene Maul, Jeremy Maul's mother, testified that in January of 1998 she was
residing in American Fork and that Maul and Angie and her two sons were residing
with her (R. 246 at 129). Janene testified that she is a "pretty light sleeper" and that
the stairs going down to Maul and Angie's rooms pass within three feet of her bedroom
door; and that she typically hears when someone comes into the house and she is in her
bedroom (R. 246 at 130-31).
Janene testified that Angie came in to her bedroom at approximately 10:15 p.m.
on January 6, 1998, and asked to borrow her car (R. 246 at 134). Janene agreed if
Maul watched the two children because Janene had to be up early the next morning
(Id.). Janene testified that sometime after 1:00 a.m. Angie came in to her bedroom,
"dropped the keys off on the dresser and sa[id] 'I'm home'" (R. 246 at 136). Janene
testified that she was next awakened at 4:30 a.m. by her alarm clock (Id.). Janene
testified that other than Angie, she saw or heard no one leave or enter the house
between midnight and 4:30 a.m. (R. 246 at 137).
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At approximately 4:50 Janene received a phone call from Angie's grandmother
and went downstairs where she found Maul and Angie asleep in their bed (R. 246 at
140). Janene testified that on her way to work at approximatley 5:10 a.m. she was
stopped by the police, ordered out of her car, took her to the police station and detained
her until 7:30 a.m. (R. 246 at 141-43).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees to criminal defendants
the right to a fair and impartial jury. Maul asserts that in this case, he was denied that
constitutional protection. One of the juror's failure to disclose a relationship between
herself and the key defense witnesses led to the inclusion of a biased individual on the
jury panel. Her failure to disclose this connection prevented any investigation of the
relationship on voir dire and more importantly it prevented Maul from exercising an
informed peremptory challenge. When this hostile relationship between juror and
witnesses became known, Maul filed a motion for a new trial with the trial court which
was denied. Maul asserts that this denial constitutes a reversible abuse of discretion.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
ARREST JUDGMENT AND GRANT MAUL A NEW TRIAL
ON GROUNDS OF JUROR BIAS
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantees to criminal defendants the
right to a trial by an impartial jury. See, State v. Brooks. 563 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah
1977). Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the "right to a trial by a
fair and impartial jury is an important one which should be scrupulously safeguarded."
State v. Durand. 569 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1977). Maul asserts that he was denied
his right to a fair and impartial jury by Juror Christine Christensen's failure to advise
the trial court of her relationship with several key witnesses during jury selection and
voir dire.
Upon learning of these relationships after trial, Maul filed with the trial court a
motion to arrest judgment in the form of a motion for new trial on grounds of juror
bias. Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the trial court can
arrest judgment prior to sentence for any "good cause." Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure similarly grants to the trial court the ability to grant a new trial "in
the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial
adverse affect upon the rights of a party." Maul asserts that Christensen's failure to
disclose her familiarity (and accompanying bias) with several key witnesses was
15

improper and substantially and adversely affected Maul's right to trial by an impartial
jury. In addition, the trial court's failure to grant Maul a new trial once this failure was
shown constituted an abuse of discretion. See, Williams, 712 P.2d at 222.
The jury selection process is designed to insure the empaneling of a fair and
impartial jury. Indeed "voir dire serves two functions: 'the detection of actual bias
[sufficient to challenge for cause], and the collection of data to permit informed
exercise of the peremptory challenge.'" State v. Brooks. 868 P.2d 818, 822 (Utah App.
1994) (quoting State v. Taylor. 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983)). Maul asserts that
Christensen's failure to disclose even the casual nature of her relationship with the
Nielson's and more particularly with Mary and Angela Goode goes to the very heart of
the purpose for jury voir dire. One, it prevented the detection of actual bias in her
feelings about Mary and Angela Goode. Two, more importantly it stripped Maul and
his counsel of the ability to engage in an informed exercise of the peremptory
challenge.
In State v. Brooks. 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1977), a potential juror during voir dire
disclosed that he was a neighbor of one of the prosecution's key witnesses. This
disclosure led to a lengthy exchange between the juror, the trial court and counsel
which highlighted the extent and depth of the relationship. 563 P.2d at 800-01. At the
close of the exchange, defense counsel challenged the juror for cause which was denied
by the trial court on the grounds that the juror and witness were "acquaintances."
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Brooks. 563 P.2d at 801. However, the Utah Supreme Court reversed because the
record, as developed in the exchange between juror, counsel and the trial court,
indicated that a real friendship existed between the prospective juror and witness. IcL
Maul asserts that the relationship between juror Christensen and Mary and
Angela Goode goes beyond the casual nature found by the trial court after trial. Mary
and Angela Goode's testimony was critical to Maul's alibi defense at trial.

Moreover,

Christensen's failure to disclose any relationship between her and the defense witnesses
prevented the trial court and counsel from engaging in further investigation of any
actual bias on the part of Christensen as it related to her feelings towards Mary and
Angela Goode. In addition, the failure to disclose any relationship prevented Maul
from collecting the data which would have permitted the informed exercise of a
peremptory challenge to dismiss Christensen from the jury panel.
In State v. Suarez. 793 P.2d 934 (Utah App. 1990), this Court adopted the twoprong test of the United States Supreme Court in McDonough Power Equipment v.
Greenwood. 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 850 (1984), to determine whether a
juror should be excused for cause for answering falsely on voir dire. In Suarez, a
prospective juror on voir dire answered a question concerning the veracity of police
officers in a manner which was inconsistent with his response to a similar question by a
different judge earlier in the day. 793 P.2d at 935-36. Defense counsel challenged the
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juror for cause and the trial denied that challenge. Defense counsel subsequently used a
peremptory challenge to have the juror dismissed. Suarez, 793 P.2d at 939.
This Court reversed the trial court concluding that "on the record before us" the
juror "should have been excused for cause" since a juror's "strong and deep
impressions" concerning police veracity is a basis for a challenge for cause. Suarez.
793 P.2d at 738-39 (citing State v. Hewitt. 689 P.2d 22, 27 (Utah 1984)). However,
this Court noted in footnote 11 that there may have been many explanations for the
juror's inconsistent answers but that "these possibilities are only speculative since the
trial court failed to 'investigate further until the inference of bias was rebutted....'"
(citation omitted).
In this case, Christensen's failure to disclose the relationship between herself and
Maul's key alibi witnesses-and her potential bias against them because of an alleged
relationship between her husband and Angela Goode and an sour employment
relationship between herself and Mary Goode-prevented any investigation by the trial
court and counsel into such an inference of bias. More importantly, the failure to
disclose even a casual relationship prevented Maul from exercising a peremptory
challenge to dismiss her from the panel. Whereas at least in Brooks and Suarez—two
cases later reversed by Utah appellate courts-defense counsel was able to exercise an
informed peremptory challenge and dismiss the challenged jurors from the panel. See
also, State v. Lacev. 665 P.2d 1311 (Utah 1983). Accordingly the real prejudice
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suffered in this case by Christensen's failure to disclose was not present in Brooks,
Suarez or Lacey because the challenged jurors in those cases were dismissed from the
panel and did not render judgment against the defendant.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Maul asks that this Court reverse his convictions on grounds that the trial court
erred in failing to arrest judgment and grant him a new trial on grounds of juror bias.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _S_ day of August, 1999.

RANDY S. KE!>TER
Counsel for Appellant

MARGARET P. LINDSA
Counsel for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delliered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief to the Utah Attorney General, Appeals Division, 160 E. 300 South, 6th Floor,
P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this _£Tday of August, 1999.
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UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rose v District Court 67 Utah 526, 248 P 486
(1926)
The time fixed by the statute was not juris
dictionai and since it was regarded as merely
directory, the further provision that a judgment
should be rendered withm a reasonable time
has been judicially read into the statute State
v Fedder, 1 Utah 2d 117 262 P2d 753 (1953)
Kelbach v McCotter 872 P2d 1033 (Utah
1994)
Time limits are directory, not mandatory, and
trial court's failure to comply with them does
not divest it of jurisdiction to pass sentence,
where sentence is imposed within a reasonable
time so that the delay does not amount to an
abuse of the court's powers or adversely affect
the defendant, he is not entitled to go free but
only to have a correct sentence imposed, with
due consideration given for any time served
because of the delay State v Helm, 563 P2d
794 (Utah 1977)
Defendant who was convicted in March,
1976, placed on probation in October, 1976, and
had probation revoked and sentence imposed in
September, 1978, was sentenced within reasonable time State v J a m s , 597 P 2 d 873 (Utah
1979)
C o n t i n u a n c e for d e f e n d a n t
Where there is a reasonable extension of time
for sentencing made at defendant's request or
with his consent or where extension was calculated to be for defendant's possible benefit in
determining whether he should be placed on
probation, failure to impose sentence within
statutory time was not ground for defendant's
release State v Helm, 563 P2d 794 (Utah
1977)
Waiver
Failure to object to delay in pronouncing

Rule 23

judgment waived the right to object Rose v
District Court 67 Ltah 526 248 P 486 (1926)
S t a t e m e n t s before s e n t e n c i n g
—Defendant
Requirement that defendant be asked
whether he has an\ caube why judgment
should not be pronounced against him was
substantially complied with b> question as to
whether he or his counsel had anything to state
prior to sentencing State \ McClendon, 611
P2d 728 (Utah 1980)
The defendant's due process right of allocution was satisfied u h e n the sentencing hearing
was held in his presence where he was ad
dressed by the judge and elected to speak, an
amended judgment subsequently entered by
the trial court at which the defendant was not
present nor represented by counsel, reflected
only a correction of a clerical mistake in his
sentence State v Lorrah, 761 P2d 1388 (Utah
1988)
Because by statute allocution is a right to
introduce a mitigating statement and because
capital defendants are entitled to present to the
sentencing jury a m mitigating information,
courts must permit allocution at the sentencing
phase,
when
requested,
rather
than
postverdict State v Young, 853 P2d 327 (Utah
1993)
Validity of c o n v i c t i o n
Issues concerning the validity of a conviction
are not cognizable under Subdivision (e) of this
rule State v Brooks 908 P2d 856 (Utah 1995)
Cited in State v Babbel, 813 P2d 86 (Utah
1991)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am J u r 2d Criminal Law
§ 526 et seq
C.J.S. — 24 C J S Criminal Law § 1458 et
seq
A.L.R. — Consideration of accused's juvenile
court record m sentencing for offense committed as adult, 64 A L R 3d 1291
Loss of jurisdiction by delay m imposing
sentence, 98 A L R 3d 605
Propriety of sentencing justice's consider-

Rule 23. Arrest of

ation of defendant's failure or refusal to accept
plea bargain, 100 A L R 3d 834
Accused's right to sentencing by same judge
who accepted guilty plea entered pursuant to
plea bargain, 3 A L R 4th 1181
Guilty plea as affected by fact that sentence
contemplated by plea bargain is subsequently
determined to be illegal or unauthorized, 87
A L R 4th 384

judgment.

At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts
proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant is
mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment Upon
arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense
charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until the
defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may be
just and proper under the circumstances.

Rule 24
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Challenge to jurisdiction.
Grounds.
Mental illness.
Prosecutorial misconduct.
Standard.
Variance between charge and verdict.
Cited.
C h a l l e n g e to j u r i s d i c t i o n
Jurisdictional question was properly raised
by motion in arrest of judgment. State v.
Merritt, 67 Utah 325, 247 P. 497 (1926).
Grounds
A judgment may be arrested based on an
insufficiency of the evidence or facts as proved
in trial or as admitted by the parties. State v.
Workman, 806 P.2d 1198 (Utah Ct. App. 1991),
afFd, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah 1993).
An arrest of judgment is appropriate where
the verdict is based on inherently improbable
evidence. State v. Workman, 806 P.2d 1198
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), aff'd, 852 P.2d 981 (Utah
1993).

ment, even though defendant's motion for arrest of judgment or in the alternative for a new
trial was made before imposition of sentence.
State v. Owens, 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).
Standard
A trial court may arrest a jury verdict when
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict, is so inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to an element of the crime
that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt as to that element. State v.
Petree, 659 R2d 443 (Utah 1983); State v.
McCardell, 652 R2d 942 (Utah 1982); State v.
Romero, 554 R2d 216 (Utah 1976); State v.
Workman, 852 R2d 981 (Utah 1993).

Mental illness
Where an alienist specifically found defendant competent to proceed to sentencing, trial
court did not err in refusing to arrest judgment
despite the fact t h a t defendant may have suffered from an undetermined mental illness.
State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 (Utah 1988).

Variance between c h a r g e and verdict
Although the verdict form signed by the jury
foreman stated that the defendant was guilty of
"forcible sexual assault" and the information
had charged the defendant with "aggravated
sexual assault," the variance did not justify the
granting of a motion to arrest judgment on the
basis of uncertainty as to what the jury intended; an error on the jury verdict form does
not create uncertainty per se, and there was no
reason to doubt that the jury intended to find
the defendant guilty as charged. State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987).

Prosecutorial misconduct
Prosecutorial misconduct before trial was
grounds for a new trial, not an arrest of judg-

Cited in State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah
1989); State v. Belgard, 830 P 2 d 264 (Utah
1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A m . Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§§ 520 to 524.
C.J.S. — 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1453 et
seq.

AX.R. — Coram nobis on ground of other's
confession to crime, 46 A.L.R.4th 468.

Rule 24, Motion for new trial.
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant
a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which
h a d a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it
deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 10 days after imposition of
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix during the ten-day
period.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned
either in evidence or in argument.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Absence of witness.
Affidavits of jurors.

Bias or prejudice of jurors.
Discretion of court.

ROSS C. BLACKHAM #0357
Sanpete County Attorney
Sanpete County Courthouse
160 North Main
Manti, Utah 84642
Telephone: (435) 835-6381
Facsimile: (435) 835-6383
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

;
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
>

JERAMIAH J. MAUL,
Defendant.

Criminal No. 981600003
Assigned Judge: Kay L. Mclff

)

The defendant's Motion for a New Trial having come before the Court on November 4,1998.
The defendant was personally present and was represented by his attorney, Randy Kester. The State
was represented by Ross C Blackham, Sanpete County Attorney. The Court having heard witnesses
in this matter, and arguments thereon, and being fully advised in the premises now makes the
following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1) Christine Christensen served as a juror in the above entitled case on August 27th and 28th,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - State of Utah vs. Maul - 981600003 - Page 2

1998. Defendant found guilty by the jury of 3 felony offenses.
2) Mary Goode and Angela Goode were witnesses for the defendant at trial. Angela Good
was the defendant's main alibi witness. Angela Goode was living with the defendant in American
Fork, Utah on the date the offense was committed. Mary Goode is the mother of Angela Goode.
3)

Clay Nielsen and Craig Nielsen testified for the State at the trial.

Clay Nielsen and

Angela Goode had a child together prior to the date of the offense but were not married. Clay
Nielsen is the son of Craig Nielsen.
4) When the Court was picking jurors in this case the above named four witnesses were
named and identified by the parties as potential witnesses. Christine Christensen did not advise the
Court about any acquaintance she had with any of the above four named witnesses.
5) The Court had instructed all potential jurors to inform the Court about any relationship
or acquaintance they had with the witnesses that was something other than the casual acquaintance
acquired by people living in small towns.
6)

For a two month period in 1993 Christine Christensen and Mary Goode worked as

housekeepers (maids) in the same motel in Nephi, Utah. Christensen5s contact with Mary Goode was
minimal, of a short duration, and of a nonpersonal nature dealing with their duties as housekeepers.
7)

Christine Christensen had no social involvement, contact, or relationship with Mary

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - State of Utah vs. Maul - 981600003 - Page 3

Goode outside of work at the motel in 1993 and only knew her as a person who lived in the same
town, Fountain Green, and who worked at the same motel for 2 months in 1993. Since 1993 she
has had no contact with Mary Goode.
8) For approximately 8 years Christine Christensen lived at 40 North State Street in Fountain
Green, Utah. For part of that time Craig Nielsen lived across the State Highway from her. That all
she knew about him at the time they lived across the highway from each other was that his name was
Nielsen. She had no contact with him.
9) After the trial in this matter Christine Christensen moved from 40 North State Street in
Fountain Green to 477 South 200 West in Fountain Green, Utah. That the home at 40 North State
Street in Fountain Green was a rental home. After the Christensen's left the home the owner of the
home re-rented the home to Clay Nielsen. Christine Christensen had nothing to do with the rental
of the home by the owner to Clay Nielsen.
10)

Christine Christensen had no personal contact with Clay Nielsen at all other than

knowing who he was.
11) Angela Goode lived in Fountain Green with her mother Mary Goode for approximately
10-12 years. During that time Christine Christensen became aware of who she was. During that
time they had been together at the same social function with several other people but were just casual
acquaintances.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - State of Utah vs. Maul - 981600003 - Page 4

12)

Christine Christensen also had contact with Angela Goode at Christine's place of

employment, the 7-11 store in Nephi. That those contacts were incidental relating to Angela going
into the store for business purposes.
13) Allegations made by Angela Goode that a rumor existed in Fountain Green that Angela
Goode was having an affair with Christine Christensen's husband were un-communicated to and
unknown by Mrs. Christensen. The Court finds no credibility in these un-communicated innuendoes.
14)

The Court finds that in instances of conflict between the testimony of Christine

Christensen and Angela Goode, the testimony of Christine Christensen to be more credible.
15) Christine Christensen's relationship and knowledge relating to Mary Goode, Angela
Goode, Clay Nielsen and Craig Nielsen are all of a casual nature. Her contact with all of these people
was minimal.
16) Mary Goode and Angela Goode both knew who Christine Christensen was, and that she
was a potential juror prior to her being picked to serve on the jury.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court having made the above and foregoing Findings of Fact now makes the following
Conclusions of Law:
1) No actual or implied bias against the defendant by Christine Christensen has been shown.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW - State of Utah vs. Maul - 981600003 - Page 5

2) No basis would have existed for any challenge for cause against Mrs. Christensen.
3) The defendant's Motion for a New Trial should be denied.
DATED this

*H*efj-1998.

BY THE COURT:

€z

AY L. McJfFF
DISTRICTCOURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the defendant's attorney, Randy Kester
at 101 East 200 South, Springville, Utah 84663, postage prepaid this J3** day of November, 1998.

\Q2tua*
Secretary

a-ni4{)

RANDY S. KESTER (#4357)
YOUNG & KESTER
Attorneys for Defendant
101 East 200 South
Springville, Utah 84663
Telephone: (801) 489-3294

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
160 N. Main, Manti, Utah 84642

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JEREMIAH MAUL,
Defendant.

;)

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

;
]
)
;
)
]

Case No: 981600003
Judge Kay L. Mclff

The Defendant, by and through counsel, Randy S. Kester of Young & Kester, under Rule 24
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, moves the Court for an Order granting a new trial on the
basis that error and impropriety was committed which had a substantial adverse affect upon the
rights of the Defendant and in the interest of justice, a new trial should be granted.
The basis for this motion is the realization and discovery following the trial that one of the
jurors, to wit: Cliristine Cliristensen was not candid, honest and forthcoming in her answers to the
voir dire questions.

1

One of the voir dire questions to the jury was whether or not they knew or were acquainted
with any of the witnesses to be called in the case. Two of Defendants witnesses were Angela Goode
and Mary Goode. Angela Goode was the chief alibi witness for the Defendant and Mary Goode was
not only the mother of Angela Goode but also testified to Angela's whereabouts, Jeremiah Maul's
whereabouts and the phone conversation had with the State's chief witness Deputy Edwards, the
evening prior to the commission of the crime and the early morning hours of the commission of the
crime January 6 and 7, 1998.
Following the Trial, it was brought to the attention through his counsel and through Mary
Goode, that she realized this same Christine Cliristensen was a former employee of hers. Mary
Goode is and has been a supervisor at the Super 8 Motel in Nephi, Utah. In the recent past, Christine
Cliristensen served as a maid at that same Super 8 Motel and Mary Goode was her supervisor. The
affidavit of Mary Goode indicates that Christine Christensen's leaving and the circumstances
surrounding that termination were not pleasant and in fact, somewhat adverse.
The Affidavits of Mary and Angela Good further establish that Christine Christensen:
a)

Knows and in fact has spread rumors and made false accusations about Angela

Goode and Ms. Christensen's husband, Allen.
b)

Lives next door to Clay Nielson's brother, a brother who is often visited by

c)

Is married to Allen Christensen who is a long-time friend of Clay Nielson and

Clay Nielson.

his brother's and in fact attended school with Clay and his brothers.
2

d)

Is well acquainted with Cal Nielsen, Clay's brother and that Cal Nielsen is

a good friend and long-time acquaintance of Allen Christensen, Christine's husband.
Had any of this information been revealed by juror Christensen at the time of the voir dire
questioning, said juror would have been subject to challenge and based upon any of this information
would have entitled the Defendant to inquire further as to the circumstances surrounding that
termination, acquaintances and to the bias, adversity or prejudice created by those acquaintances
termination of employment, adverse accusations and relationships.
Attached please find the Affidavits of Mary Goode and Angela Goode in support of this
motion.
Based thereon, the Defendant moves the Court for a new trial to be heard by a jury of the
Defendant's peers who are free from bias, prejudice or impartiality and to schedule this matter for
immediate hearing.
DATED this V<^ day of September, 1998.

O S)\\^-^
RANDY S. KESTER
Attorney for Defendant

3

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

/ / day of September,, 1998^ I mailed a true and correct

of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid.
Ross C. Blackham, Esq.
Sanpete County Courthouse
160 N. Main
Manti, Utah 84642
/
^
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RANDY S. KESTER (#4357)
YOUNG & KESTER
Attorneys for Defendant
101 East 200 South
Springville, Utah 84663
Telephone: (801) 489-3294
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
160 N. Main, Manti, Utah 84642

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JEREMIAH MAUL,
Defendant.

])

AFFIDAVIT OF ANGELA GOODE

;
]
)
]
)
]

Case No. 981600003
Judge Kay L. Mclff

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH)
Angela Goode, having been first duly sworn, under oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I was the chief alibi witness for the Defendant in the above captioned matter at Trial

on August 27, 28, 1998.
2.

I became aware that one of the sitting jurors, more particular Christine Christensen

was a former acquaintance of mine and have known her for approximately 5 years.

1

3.

A couple of years ago, Allen, Christine Christensen's husband informed a friend of

mine that Christine was making accusations of Allen and me having an improper relationship with
one another. These allegations were untrue.
4.

Since Christine has known me for approximately five years and has actually made

accusations against me, she should have made it known to the Court that she should not serve as a
juror based upon our past association.
DATED this //")

day of September, 1998.

UA^M

\yJ7tk

ANGEEA GOODE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

)
) ss.
)

Angela Goode, being first duly sworn upon this oath, deposes and says that she has read
the foregoing and understands the contents thereof, and the same is true of her own knowledge,
information and belief.
(-

^ft'GElA
GOODE
CffidfiLA. GOOT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to beforexne this _/0day of September, 1998.
NOTARY PU8UC

«101 •East £200 South
»

I

NOTARY PUBLltT

SprtngvHle, Utah 84663
My Commission Expires: 7-1949
State of Utah

SSSSSSS!
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

/f

day of September, 1998,1 mailed a true and correct copy

of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid.
Ross C. Blackham, Esq.
Sanpete County Courthouse
160 N. Main
Manti, Utah 84642
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RANDY S. KESTER (#4357)
YOUNG & KESTER
Attorneys for Defendant
101 East 200 South
Springville, Utah 84663
Telephone: (801) 489-3294
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
160 N. Main, Manti, Utah 84642

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JEREMIAH MAUL,
Defendant.

;)

AFFIDAVIT OF MARY GOODE

;
]
)
;
)
]

Case No. 981600003
Judge Kay L. Mclff

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH)
Mary Goode, having been first duly sworn, under oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I was a witness for the Defendant Jeremiah Maul at the jury trial conducted before

the Sixth Judicial District Court of Sanpete County, State of Utah, which jury trial occurred on
Thursday and Friday of August 27 and 28, 1998 before the Honorable K. L. Mclff.
2.

The core of my testimony was in support of the Defendant's major alibi witness, my

1

daughter Angela Goode. Her testimony was to the effect that Mr. Maul was with her the entire early
morning hours from 1:15 a.m. until the time of their arrest at approximately 7:15 a.m. on the
morning of January 7, 1998.
3.

My testimony was to the effect that my daughter by herself had been at my home

from approximately 11:30 to approximately midnight on the late hours of January 6, 1998. My
further testimony was that she was alone, that the Defendant Jeremiah Maul was not with her nor
was she in the company of anyone else and that she left my home at approximately midnight.
4.

My further testimony was to the effect that I received a call in the early morning

hours from Deputy Edwards and as part of that conversation and he made inquiry about whether I
had seen Angela or Jeremiah and his testimony was that I replied, "they" were at my home earlier
that evening at midnight.
5.

In my testimony at trial, I testified that in fact I may very well have replied in that

fashion because of the way the question was asked and the fact that I was still waking. The fact of
the matter was that only Angela came to my home. Mr. Maul never came to my home on the
evening of January 6th nor was he at my home at any time on January 6 or 7, 1998.
6.

I am currently employed as a supervisor at Super 8 Motel in the City of Nephi, Juab

County, State of Utah. I have been so employed in that position for approximately 6 years.
7.

In the recent past, in approximately 1996 or 1997, Christine Christensen was

employed there as a maid. The same Christine Christensen served as juror in this case.
8.

Her work under my supervision was unsatisfactory while employed at the Super 8
2

and at some point, her employment was ended.
9.

This termination was not under pleasant circumstances and it is my sincere opinion

that this same Christine Christensen had feelings of animosity toward me for those circumstances.
They were adverse to the point that I am certain that she would have remembered me.
10.

It is my opinion that this animosity carried over into her service as a juror and may

have tainted the impartiality of the jury with regard to my testimony and more particularly that of
my daughter Angela Goode, the Defendant's chief alibi witness.
11.

As the Court is aware, pursuant to the court imposing the exclusionary rule, I was not

present during the trial nor did I realize until the last jclosings of the trial that this same Christine
Christensen was my former employee whom had left my employment with adverse feelings.
12.

I have no explanation why she would remain on the jury having those adverse

feelings. I have no explanation why she would not reveal that under voir dire. I am advised that the
jurors were asked if they were acquainted with any of the witnesses who would be testifying and I
have no doubt that when I was testifying Ms. Christensen knew exactly who I was and would
remember me.
13.

Being familiar with the circumstances surrounding her termination of employment,

it is my strong opinion that she could not have had that experience and not have some adverse
feelings toward me and even toward my daughter Angela. I believe that in the realm of common
human experience, that was an event in her life that would have been highly emotional and unusual
event to which she would have carried some kind of animosity of at least a minimal degree.
3

14.

I can candidly tell the court that if someone fired me from a job, I would remember

them and I would certainly have adverse feelings about it. It would make me uncomfortable serving
as a juror in which I believe would effect my impartiality as a juror in a serious criminal case
equivalent to this case before the Court.
15.

I am also aware that this same Ms. Christensen is next door neighbors to the brother

of Clay Nielson; that Clay often visits this brother in Fountain Green and that Clay is acquainted
with Ms. Christensen. My daughter Angela is in the middle of a custody dispute with Clay Nielson.
16.

Furthermore, Ms. Christensen's husband, Allen Christensen, attended school with

Clay Nielson and his brothers and is a long time acquaintance of Clay.
17.

Moreover, Clay's brother Cal Nielson is a long time acquaintance and good friend

of Allen Christensen, Mrs. Christensen's husband.
18.

I am also aware that this same Ms. Christensen knows my daughter Angela and has

made false accusations about her perception of an alleged relationship between Ms. Christensen's
husband and Angela.
19.

Despite these many connections, acquaintances and adverse relationships, I

understand from Mr. Kester that Ms. Christensen revealed none of these.
DATED this ) Q

day of September, 1998.

^ ^ v vV
. ... ) ™ 9MARY-GOOfe
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STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF UTAH
)
Mary Goode, being first duly sworn upon this oath, deposes and says that she has read the
foregoing and understands the contents thereof, and the same is true of her own knowledge,
information and belief.
* ft ^4
k ,
A
MARMJOOD^
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to beforome this jQ day of September, 1998.
NOTARY PUBUC

DIANE DENUNGER

101 East 200 South
Spnngvilie. Utah 84663
My Commission Expires. 7 1^99
State of Utah

NOTARY PUBLIC

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

/^

day of September, 1998,1 mailed a true and correct copy

of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid.
Ross C. Blackham, Esq.
Sanpete County Courthouse
160 N. Main
Manti, Utah 84642

(
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ROSS C. BLACKHAM #0357
Sanpete County Attorney
Sanpete County Courthouse
160 North Main
Manti, Utah 84642

jUuioas

Telephone: (435)835-6381
Facsimile: (435) 835-6383

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

AFFIDAVIT OF
CHRISTINE CHRISTENSEN
Criminal No. 981600003
Assigned Judge: Kay L. Mclff

JEREMIAH MAUL,
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SANPETE

)
:ss
)

CHRISTINE CHRISTENSEN, being first duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and states the
following:
1) That I was a member of the jury in the above captioned trial on August 27th and 28th,
1998.
2) That I have read the affidavits filed by Angela Goode and Mary Goode which have been
filed in this case in support of a motion for a new trial. That the allegations made in those affidavits

AFFIDAVIT of Christine Christensen - Page 2

of bias and/or misconduct on my part are false and untrue.
3) Specifically with regard to the allegations of Angela Goode it is true that I know who she
is and have known for approximately 5 years but that our relationship is simply an acquaintance. I
do not, and never have had any kind of personal, business, or social relationship with her and have
never associated with her on any such basis. My acquaintance with her is much the same as the casual
acquaintance I have with many people in the small town of Ft. Green where I live.
4)

The allegations made by Angela Goode that a u a couple of years ago Allen, Christine

Christensen's husband, informed a friend of mine that Christine was making accusations of Allen
and me having an improper relationship with one another", is absolutely false and untrue. I have
never made any such allegations and know of no basis for such allegations.
5) Specifically with regard to the allegations made by Mary Goode in her affidavit, it is true
that in approximately 1993 or 1994, not 1996 or 1997 as alleged by Mary Goode, I was employed
as a maid at the Super 8 Motel in Nephi, Utah. At the time Mary Goode was also employed there.
Her allegations that she was my supervisor are untrue.

My supervisor was Myda Carter.

I left my employment at the Super 8 because of needing more time at home with an infant child.
My leaving Super 8 was not a termination under unpleasant circumstances as alleged by
Mary Goode and it is totally untrue and false that I had any feelings of animosity towards Mary

AFFIDAVIT of Christine Christensen - Page 3

Goode. Our relationship was and always has been simply one of an acquaintance of another person
who lives in the same small town and a person who I have no social or business relationships with
except for a period of time where we worked at the same place.
6) In the process of the trial when the judge asked if we knew any of the witnesses, he
advised us that he was not interested in mere casual acquaintances but was interested in knowing
about relationships that went beyond that. I did not respond to the Court that I knew Angela Goode
and Mary Goode, as well as Deputy Gary Larsen who testified for the State because all these people
are just acquaintances of mine in the causal manner of small towns.
7) The other person that the affidavits of Angela and Mary Goode state that I am acquainted
with, the brother of Clay Nielsen, Cal is also a mere acquaintance of mine and was not listed in any
event as a witness in the case.
8) That my acquaintance with these witnesses did not interfere with my ability to be a fair
and impartial juror. I judged this case, and based my verdict solely and completely on the evidence
presented at the trial.
DATED this 4>Q day of October, 1998.

CHRISTINE CHRISTENSEN

AFFIDAVIT of Christine Chnstensen - Page 4

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this $0 day of October, 1998.
My Commission Expires:
:- ^I^LAL N o ^ Public
t STFPHENSEN 1
185 North Mai*
^
N*phi, Utah 84648
^
My Commission Expiree •
Janu ry 25, 2001
I
State of Utah
J

Nqjiary Public
Residing at:

